Sociotechnical controversies as warning signs for niche governance by Belmin, Raphael et al.
HAL Id: hal-02270549
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02270549
Submitted on 26 Aug 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Sociotechnical controversies as warning signs for niche
governance
Raphael Belmin, Jean-Marc Meynard, Laurent Julhia, François Casabianca
To cite this version:
Raphael Belmin, Jean-Marc Meynard, Laurent Julhia, François Casabianca. Sociotechnical contro-
versies as warning signs for niche governance. Agronomy for Sustainable Development, Springer
Verlag/EDP Sciences/INRA, 2018, 38 (5), pp.44. ￿10.1007/s13593-018-0521-7￿. ￿hal-02270549￿
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Sociotechnical controversies as warning signs for niche governance
Raphael Belmin1,2,3 & Jean-Marc Meynard4 & Laurent Julhia5 & François Casabianca1
Accepted: 12 July 2018 /Published online: 23 August 2018
# INRA and Springer-Verlag France SAS, part of Springer Nature 2018
Abstract
In agriculture, not all sociotechnical niches seek to plant the seeds of further regime transition: Some niches are designed to last as
stable subnetworks harboring alternative agri-food systems. However, such niches often interact with sociotechnical regimes,
leading to controversies, conflicts, and threats to niches sustainability. This situation calls for proactive governance of niche-
regime interactions. We studied the innovation process in the “Corsican clementine” niche, using semi-structured interviews and
participant observation. We wondered how local actors have been dealing with three controversial innovations: a clementine
variety, a biological pest control method, and a pruning technique. Cross-analysis of the three innovations shows that (i) the
niche’s innovation pathway can be diverted by regime-driven innovations; (ii) to protect their niche, local actors set collective
rules, both formal and informal; and (iii) controversies over technical innovations make niche-regime tensions more visible,
leading local actors to make collective decisions for governing the innovation pathway. This study is the first to highlight the key
role of sociotechnical controversies in niche governance.
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1 Introduction
In Europe, there is a consensus over the need to speed up the
transition to more sustainable agriculture. However, despite
proactive policies, significant change in farming practices
has yet to be seen (Guichard et al. 2017; IPES-Food 2016).
Several studies suggest that desirable changes are hampered
by lock-in of the sociotechnical regime (Duru et al. 2015;
Meynard and Messéan 2014). A sociotechnical regime is un-
derstood as a stable network that frames the evolution of
technologies. Regimes rely for their stability onmutual depen-
dencies between actors, alignment between rules of various
kinds, and the “hardness” of artifacts and material networks
(Geels 2004). In a regime, innovation occurs incrementally,
through a gradual accumulation of novelties that synergize
with the dominant technology. In agriculture, promising alter-
native models such as agroecology often fail to upscale, owing
to the stability of the sociotechnical regime (Magrini and
Triboulet 2012; Stassart and Jamar 2009; Vanloqueren and
Baret 2009).
Therefore, several scholars emphasized the need to support
the development of sociotechnical niches (Darnhofer 2014;
Geels 2002; Meynard and Messéan 2014). Sociotechnical
niches are protected spaces where alternative networks design
and develop breakthrough innovations. Niches are generally
regarded as banks of options for further regime transition. But,
in agriculture, niches do not always aim at transforming the
regime. Some niches are designed to last, as stable networks
sheltering distinctive production and consumption practices
(Belmin et al. 2018). European agriculture provides a number
of such examples: farmhouse production (e.g., farmhouse
bakeries), community-supported agriculture, short supply
chains, geographical indications, etc. These niches enrich
our agri-food systems since they are sources of diversity: di-
versity of tastes or of values embedded in products, consistent
with each food culture and with emerging consumer demand
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(Vandecandelaere et al. 2009); and diversity of cropping prac-
tices, tailored to the constraints and resources of each agro-
climatic areas (Duru et al. 2014).
Until now, most studies of agricultural transitions have fo-
cused on how niches can emerge and expand to unlock the
incumbent regime. In so doing, they leave aside the crucial
question of niche stability. This question is important since
exogenous innovations can intrude into a niche and
undermine its sustainability. Belmin et al. (2018) argue that
niches are continuously interacting with the sociotechnical re-
gimes, leading to exogenous tensions (sanctioning of non-
standard products by mainstream actors) and endogenous ten-
sions (propensity of niche-actors to align their practices with
the standard). If such tensions are not properly managed, a
niche can gradually collapse or gradually align with the domi-
nant production model. Maintenance of an endogenous inno-
vation pathway depends on proactive governance capable of
mitigating undesirable changes (Belmin and Casabianca 2018).
In agriculture, niche-regime interactions often lead to con-
troversies and conflicts. Discord occurs when outsiders take
over the innovations that have been developed in niches,
disconnecting them from their ideological foundations
(Ingram 2018). The controversies that arise generally oppose
two points of view: One side thinks the niche should extend its
influence by hybridizing with regime, while the other thinks
such expansion is undesirable because it will “conventionalize”
the original alternative model. This kind of tension has been
described in connection with organic farming (Stassart and
Jamar 2009; Teil 2012), permaculture (Ingram 2018), and geo-
graphical indications (Belmin 2016; Bowen 2010). In other
research fields, some authors have suggested that controversies
can play an active role in the governance of innovation (Callon
1981; Joly 2001; Rip 1986; Torre 2016). Controversies reveal
the changes taking place in social groups or territories. They
force innovation promoters to open the black box of their im-
plicit assumptions and clarify their projects’ underlying values.
Controversies can also act as catalysts for local democracy: The
promoters of an innovation are faced with alternative views
about development challenges, and minor stakeholders are
brought back into the decision process (Rip 1986).
In light of the foregoing, we wondered what role contro-
versial innovations play in the governance of niches. We as-
sumed that controversies over technical innovations can make
niche-regime tensions more visible, leading to changes in the
governance of the local innovation process. To test this hy-
pothesis, we studied the way three agronomic innovations
have spread in the “Corsican clementine” niche: a clementine
variety, a biological pest control method, and a pruning tech-
nique. These three innovations generated controversies since
they clearly implemented a major breakthrough in the prac-
tices. The Corsican clementine niche is a pertinent case study
because it interacts extensively with the citrus sociotechnical
regime (Belmin et al. 2018).
2 Material and methods
Belmin et al. (2018) described the Corsican clementine pro-
duction area as a sociotechnical niche that challenges the rules
of the table citrus sector. The reputation and value of the
Corsican Clementine derive from its small caliber, acidic taste,
and green blossom end, contrasting with the large size, sweet
taste, and uniform color of the clementines favored by the
sociotechnical regime. Moreover, production of Corsican
clementines is low (only 20,000 tons per year, vs. 2 million
in the case of Spanish clementines, which dominate the
European market) and also costly, since it requires selective
picking of colored fruits with leaves attached. By contrast, the
regime encourages cost-competition and economies of scale.
Corsican clementine also enjoys an eco-friendly reputation, as
its advertising emphasizes the with-leaf presentation, the
freshness of the product and the commitment of farmers in
Agriculture raisonnée. This French certification scheme at-
tests that farmers optimize their profit while limiting the
amount of inputs they use. The niche’s main protection mech-
anism is a Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) created in
2007 (Belmin et al. 2018). The PGI operates via an internal
inspection scheme as well as specifications defining a product
ideotype (Fig. 1a), target values (within caliber grades 1 to 5,
acidity range, and sugar/acidity ratio), and production rules:
pre-harvest analysis of fruit acidity, no use of degreening prod-
ucts or other chemicals after harvest, and manual picking of
tree-ripened fruits, with at least two harvest rounds.
To analyze the controversies over technical innovations in
the Corsican clementine sociotechnical niche, we developed a
three-step method: (i) First, we identified the actors involved
in the Corsican clementine niche, and we described their func-
tions, strategies, and relationships. (ii) Then, we studied three
controversial innovations that are currently being disseminat-
ing in the Corsican clementine production area: a clementine
variety, a biological pest control method, and a pruning tech-
nique. These three cases were selected because they involve
different (though sometimes overlapping) groups of actors
and different components of the cropping system. For each
of these, we tried to understand the innovation process by
asking the following questions: In what context, how, and
by whom has the novelty been developed and spread? What
are the reasons for its adoption or rejection? What are the
positions and rhetoric of the various actors with regard to the
novelty? What are the underlying visions of technical “prog-
ress” that shape their views? (iii) Lastly, based on the study of
actor networks and controversial innovations, we sought to
understand how niche and regime interact, and how niche-
actors manage the tensions generated by these interactions.
Data were collected by various means (Table 1): (i) Open
interviews conducted in 2013, during an initial consultation stage
with the main representatives of the Corsican citrus area (23
actors interviewed). The aim of this inductive approach was to
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identify the actors and their activities, identify the main innova-
tions that are currently spreading, and build hypotheses on how
the sociotechnical system works. (ii) Semi-structured interviews
with 17 farmers, to collect data on the organization of their farm,
their cropping practices and underlying drivers and constraints,
and their sources of knowledge and inputs. At the end, the
farmers were asked why they adopted or rejected each of the
three innovations. (iii) Semi-structured interviews with 28 actors
involved in the innovation process, conducted between 2013 and
2016. Here, the aim was to understand the different actors’ strat-
egies and relationships, and to assess their influence on the on-
going diffusion of these three innovations; (iv) participant obser-
vation of various meetings organized by the actors in the
Corsican citrus sector. At each meeting, we particularly focused
on those statements that revealed the speakers’ strategies and the
knowledge they were using. We also paid attention to the inter-
play among actors when dealingwith the question of adopting or
not each controversial innovation. (v) Collection and analysis of
documents, in order to understand what technical information
farmers are given, and how agronomic knowledge is constructed
in the Research and Development network. These documents
included project proposals, newsletters from the local chamber
of agriculture, farmers’ log books, and PGI monitoring reports.
(vi) Analysis of statistical data on the local supply chain.
3 Results and discussion
3.1 The actor networks involved in the Corsican
clementine niche
In Corsica, clementines are produced on 139 farms (2013
official figure), almost all of which are in the Corsican clem-
entine Protected Geographical Indication (PGI). Clementine is
generally the main crop on these farms, with areas ranging
from 1 ha to over 40 ha. Secondary crops include kiwi, grape,
Fig. 1 a Ideotype of Corsican
clementine used in the marketing
of the Protected Geographical
Indication. The picture
emphasizes the key characteristics
of the product: (1) long, green,
slender leaves that prove the
fruit’s freshness; (2) juicy,
seedless fruits with a slightly
acidic taste; and (3) thin-skinned
fruits with a green blossom end,
which provides evidence for on-
tree coloring and ripening and no
post-harvest degreening (©
APRODEC). b Pictures of the
clementine varieties SRA 92 (left)
and SRA 535 (right). Scale 3/10
(© F. Curk-Inra). c Clementine
trees managed with the “long-
pruning” technique (left) and by
the traditional method (right).
With long-pruning, the fruiting
branches bend down under the
weight of their fruit as harvest
approaches (© R. Belmin-Inra)
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and grapefruit. Several of the larger farms are coupled with
packing stations. The work is divided among the farmer’s
family, a crop manager and permanent and temporary
workers. The actor network involved in agricultural support
is made up as follows:
– Marketing network of packing stations, marketers, whole-
salers and cooperatives who collect, pack and dispatch
the farmers’ crops. Most of the output goes to supermar-
ket chains in France. The marketers play a key role in this
supply channel, since they regulate harvests and dispatch.
– Research, development and extension network, which
disseminates knowledge to farmers and supplies them
with inputs. This network is composed of four weakly
interlinked sub-networks: (i) input suppliers, who are
the farmers’ main advisors although unconnected with
the other extension actors; (ii) seven cooperatives and
one chamber of agriculture; these are mainly concerned
with implementing the PGI inspection plan, leaving little
room for individual advice to farmers. The chamber of
agriculture also disseminates technical newsletters and
runs a network of farmers attempting to reduce the use of
Table 1 Investigation scheme and data sources. Figures in brackets indicate the number of actors interviewed from each organization
Investigation scheme Data sources
Consultation stage (2013) Citrus fruit inter-branch organization (1), experimental station (2), regional agriculture support
authority (2), organic farming advisory organization (1), farmer organization (2), plant breeder (1),
PGI defense and management organization (1), chamber of agriculture (5), citrus fruit research
organizations (4), farmers (2), competitive cluster (1)
Farmer interviews
(2013 and 2014)
17 farmers, of whom 8 are also packers
Interviews with other actors
(2013 to 2016)
Packers (9), marketers (2), organic farming advisory organization (1), chamber of agriculture (2),
input supply firm (1), citrus fruit branch organization (1), regional agriculture support authority (1),
competitive cluster (1), citrus fruit research organizations (3), union of nursery growers (1),
experimental station (1), defense and management organization for the PGI (1), cooperatives (4)
Participant observation
(2013 to 2016)
Scientific meetings: Elaboration of the scientific program of the citrus fruit research organization,
Project elaboration or implementation meetings for Prospect’Agrum, Innov’Agrumes,
and Effibioforce
Agronomic meetings: Technical unit, epidemiological surveillance unit.
Professional meetings: General meetings of the experimental station, the PGI defense and management
organization and the inter-branch organization
Public consultations: Regional conference on organic agriculture, meetings to draw up Corsica’s
rural development program
Analysis of gray literature Newsletters: irrigation, maturity, soil temperature, plant health (2013, 2014, 2015 issues).
Project Proposals:
- Effibioforce: Tison G (2014) Effibiocorse: Pourquoi le Biocontrôle n’évolue-t-il pas plus malgré son
efficacité réelle en Corse? Appel à projets de recherche « Pour et Sur le Plan Ecophyto ».
PSPE 2 - Edition 2014.
- Innov’Agrumes: Froelicher Y (2015) Innov’Agrum. Dossier de demande d’aides européenne,
Programmation 2014–2020.
- Prospect'Agrum: Julhia L, Belmin R, Froelicher Y et al. (2015) Prospect Agrum: Prospective pour
la mobilisation des ressources génétiques et la compétitivité des filières structurées autour de labels
de qualité - Cas de l’agrumiculture Corse à l’horizon 2030. Réponse AAP CASDAR 2015 Semences
et Sélection Végétale. »
- Scientific programme of the citrus fruit research organization: Delaunay A, Desclaux D,
Dessup R et al. (2013) Proposition de projet pour la future Unité Expérimentale de San Giuliano.
Rapport interne INRA, San Giuliano, juin 2013.
- Clémentine project: Belmin R (2013) Projet Bassin de Production Clémentine. Document de cadrage.
Corte, Mars 2013.
Agronomic trial reports:
- Bergougnoux P, Beissy C (2008) Restructuration des vergers de clémentine par la taille longue.
Club Expert Agrumes.
- Dubreuil N, Leboulanger A (2016) Comparaison de quatre itinéraires techniques en agriculture
biologique contre le Pou Rouge de Californie (Aonidiella aurantii). AREFLEC.
- Jacquemond C, Tison G, Curk F (2005) Une nouvelle clémentine commune pour la Corse:
La SRA 535. Poster communication. San Giuliano.
- Leboulanger A, Tison G, Kreiter P (2008) Protection du verger contre le Pou Rouge de Californie
(Aonidiella aurantii Mask.). Compte rendu d’essai. AREFLEC
Statistical data Citrus fruit inter-branch organization
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crop protection chemicals. This work flows from the
Ecophyto plan, a French agricultural policy aiming to de-
crease the use of pesticides; (iii) an experimental station
and an organic farming advisory organization, which are
conducting an ambitious research and development project
on biological pest control; and (iv) a citrus fruit research
organization that investigates the agronomic and physio-
logical determinism of clementine sensorial quality.
– Network involved in supplying genetic resources to
farmers. Three main actors—the citrus fruit research or-
ganizations, the experimental station, and the nursery
growers—form a top-down chain from breeder to farmer:
genetic resources conservation, phase I varietal creation
and plant breeding, phase II plant breeding and graft
propagation, distribution of seeds and grafts, and distri-
bution of seedlings.
– Network involved in niche governance, which shapes the
practices of farmers and other supply chain actors through
their support policies (regional agriculture support author-
ity, citrus fruit inter-branch organization) and through the
PGI rules (defense and management organization).
3.2 Sociotechnical study of three controversial
innovations
3.2.1 A new clementine variety
SRA 535 is a clementine variety with high yield and high
caliber potential (Fig. 1b). It has been spreading in Corsica since
2009. As of 2017, the area planted with SRA 535 has reached
75 ha, 5.6% of Corsica’s total clementine orchard area. At this
planting rate, the variety will cover 389 ha by 2050.
Despite its acknowledged agronomic performance, this va-
riety is worrying an increasing number of local actors. It does
not fit the Corsican clementine ideotype as set out in the PGI
specifications, i.e., a fruit of “medium caliber” with a “thin
peel”, a “green blossom end” and a “slightly acidic taste.” By
contrast, SRA 535 has a majority of large fruits (mainly cali-
bers 0, 1, and 2) and a thick peel. Most actors questioned add
that the fruit’s taste is different, blander than the traditional
variety SRA 92. A marketer testifies: “The taste is significant-
ly different from the usual taste of Corsican clementine”. The
president of the PGI defense and management organization
adds: “The fruits [of SRA 535] are too big, they have too
many filaments, it’s not Corsican clementine”.
SRA 535 is a natural mutation of the clementine tree that
was discovered in Spain in the early 1980s. It was introduced
in Corsica in 1986, and bred in the 1990s by a consortium
including Corsica’s citrus research organization and the exper-
imental station. At that time, Corsican clementine was going
through a severe crisis caused by Spain’s entry into the
European common market and the consequent loss of
Corsica’s monopoly over with-leaf marketing (Belmin 2017;
Sainte Marie and Agostini 2003). Corsican farmers, needing
to become more competitive, urged local breeders to breed
Spanish-type varieties with larger fruits. When the dissemina-
tion of SRA 535 began in 2009, the local supply chain had just
shifted its strategy to focus on origin-based quality: The PGI
had solved the problem of the small size of Corsica’s
clementines by emphasizing this trait as a heritage attribute.
Despite a broad consensus on the terroir-based strategy,
SRA 535 has spread significantly. For good reasons: actors
share a common interest in getting larger fruits. European
standard CE 1799/2001 defines classes of marketable calibers.
Since demand is highest for large fruit, price per kilo increases
with fruit size, so the different caliber classes have different
market values. In the case of Corsican clementine, calibers 1–
3 (the largest fruits) have the highest prices (Belmin et al.
2018). Smaller fruits (calibers 4–6) are less in demand, with
low prices and uncertain market outlets. So, it is easy to un-
derstand the farmers’ interest in SRA 535: Thanks to the high
proportion of large fruits, this variety offers substantial pros-
pects for improving their incomes. Moreover, larger fruit are
less costly to pick than small ones. As one farmer explains, “It
means fewer secateur snips per harvested ton”. Caliber is also
seen as a criterion of professional excellence: Our surveys
clearly show that the “good” farmers are the ones who obtain
large calibers on a regular basis. The marketers, for their part,
encourage farmers to supply themwith SRA 535 for two main
reasons. Firstly, marketers are paid in direct proportion to the
amount of business conducted, so they have a vested interest
in dealing with higher-priced fruit. Secondly, the new variety,
because it has fewer small fruits (which are harder to sell),
makes for quicker sale of the clementine harvest as a whole.
The packers also get a larger margin with high caliber fruits, as
they can process more tonnage per time unit. And, the
breeders continue to promote SRA 535 as a result of path
dependency. For the research organization and the experimen-
tal station, rejection of this variety would mean the failure of
the 25 past years of breeding work. Since they both partici-
pated in building the PGI, they are aware that the high pro-
portion of large fruits is a problem. So since 2002, they have
been running agronomic trials (pruning, rootstocks, nitroge-
nous fertilizer) to “correct what is wrong with SRA 535.”
Abandoning this variety would also diminish the relevance
of the experimental station’s accomplishments in other areas
of work. SRA 535 is used as a reference variety in various
trials (e.g., biological pest control, weed management) to es-
tablish technical benchmarks for farmers. With the network of
actors so strongly coordinated around caliber, public policies
have aligned and strengthened the lock-in: SRA 535 has not
only been authorized within the PGI, and its planting has also
been subsidized by the regional authorities.
From 2013, when commercial SRA 535 orchards gave
their first harvest, a lively controversy arose. (i) Most of the
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output from SRA 535 ended up at a low price because the PGI
specifications exclude caliber 0. So, some farmers started re-
gretting their decision to plant the new variety and said they
would return to classic varieties in future. However, it was
difficult for farmers to go back, owing to the need for invest-
ment return and the prohibitive cost of grubbing-up opera-
tions. (ii) SRA 535 was seen by some as a threat to the typi-
cality and reputation of Corsican clementine as its fruits do not
fit the Corsican clementine ideotype (medium caliber, thin
peel, slightly acidic taste). Accordingly, many actors assume
that the overall niche strategy is at risk if SRA 535 spreads
more widely. In the opinion of one marketer, the reputation of
Corsican clementine would be affected if the area planted to
SRA 535 was exceeding a certain threshold: “If everybody
grows [SRA] 535, the industry will die. If we only grow little
of it, it’s OK. But where is the limit? Now, some people are
planting half of their orchard space with SRA 535”. (iii) The
gap between SRA 535 and the classic varieties also generates
cognitive dissonance, leading to some passionate reactions.
One farmer exclaimed: “I don’t want to produce caliber dou-
ble zero and melons!”. However, the PGI gives an unclear
definition of typicality (no evaluation procedure for sensorial
quality), opening windows of opportunity for a “non-identical
twin” to join the Corsican clementine appellation.
Despite apparent unanimity on the PGI, the sociotechnical
regime and its caliber injunctions re-emerges through SRA
535. The lively controversy over this variety unveils tensions
within the local network of actors, between an objective of
higher caliber on the one hand, and the need to maintain the
Corsican clementine’s typicality on the other.
3.2.2 A biological control method
In the early 2000s, the Corsican citrus orchards were under
increasing biotic pressure, with new pests and vectors arriving
ever faster. Biological control looked like a promising solution
for dealing with the problem in a sustainable way, while at the
same time synergizing with the eco-friendly image of
Corsican clementine conveyed by the PGI. However, al-
though operational instruments were developed, farmers have
not adopted them.
Between 2002 and 2008, a biological control method—the
release of Afytis melinus to control the populations of
Californian red scale (Aonidiella aurantii Maskell)—was de-
veloped by a research consortium involving the experimental
station, the organic farming advisory organization, and the
citrus research organization. The Californian red scale is a
cochineal scale insect (mealybug) that has been spreading in
Corsica since 2003. Its larvae attach to shoots and fruits to
suck the sap. The oviposition punctures and the females’
shields mark the fruits’ peel, making the product unmarket-
able. To control the pest, farmers use chlorpyriphos-methyl
and spirotetramat, two insecticides that have harmful side
effects on auxiliary fauna. Afytis melinus is a tiny wasp that
lives as a parasite on various types of cochineals, including
Californian red scale (Hare et al. 1997). Around 15,000–
20,000 individuals can be released five to seven times a year,
between April and November, as a substitute for chemical
pesticides. Trials conducted between 2002 and 2008 proved
the efficiency of Afytis releases, either alone or combined with
other biological control methods.
This tool has been distributed to volunteering farmers since
2009, thanks to European subsidies (Agri-Environmental and
Climatic Measure). The Ecophyto plan also supported the use
of Afytis releases in Corsica, through a scheme called “Réseau
Ferme”: a group of volunteering farmers agreed to decrease
their treatment frequency index (TFI), with the support of the
chamber of agriculture. However, since 2013, the area under
biological control has remained constant at 160 ha, despite the
availability of public financial incentives and the proven effi-
cacy ofAfytis. To explain this, we need to consider the way the
market functions. The EC 1799/2001 standard not only clas-
sifies the fruits according to their caliber, but it also grades
fruits by their visual aspect, with classes Extra, I and II. To
qualify for the Extra class, fruit must be free from defects with
the exception of very slight superficial defects, provided these
do not affect the general appearance of the produce, its quality,
keeping quality, or presentation in the package. At the other
extreme, Class II covers fruits with defects in shape, coloring,
or skin (e.g., silver scales). Lastly, fruits that do not meet the
minimum requirements laid down by the EC regulation are
not marketable. These include green, under-ripe, rotten, or
ugly fruits.
These market categories have major implications. Farmers’
incomes depend not so much on the quantity of fruit harvested
but rather on the quantity and quality of the fruits dispatched
to the downstream market. Moreover, if the percentage of
undesirable fruits is too high, the packing stations charge the
farmers additional fees for their packing services. At last, mar-
ketable fruits are graded by external appearance (classes II, I,
and Extra) and the more attractive classes sell at higher prices
(Fig. 2). Afytis releases only regulate—and do not eradicate—
the populations of mealybugs, so some of the fruits’ visual
imperfections remain (puncture marks, scales). These may
be enough to downgrade a fruit batch. Under these constraints,
many farmers remain mistrustful of biological control. In their
eyes, the use of chemicals is the safest way to limit the quan-
tity of fruits discarded and get a high price for the marketable
fruits. In short, the global market’s focus on esthetic quality
prevents the farmers from shifting to biological control.
Marketers and packers also contribute to the aversion to
insect releases. Both ask farmers to keep their orchard pest-
free so as to maximize the proportion of fruits in the Extra or
Class I categories. For marketers, this is a way to increase
sales. For packers, it keeps packing costs low: If an incoming
batch is of uneven quality with many unmarketable fruits
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(spots, insect bites, etc.), they have to slow down the passage
of the fruit on the sorting table. This leads to narrower margins
and shipment delays.
Yet, the PGI specifications commit farmers to adopting
greener practices by engaging in France’s Agriculture
raisonnée certification scheme. They also narrow the range
of authorized crops protection products. Moreover, the PGI
defense and management organization spotlights biological
pest control in its marketing materials for Corsican clemen-
tine. This may encourage some farmers to adopt this method.
But, at the same time, the exclusion of class II fruits by the PGI
reinforces the market segmentation based on esthetic appeal.
Although grown in Corsica, these can no longer be sold as
Corsican clementines; they are sold as “French Origin
clementines,” their selling price barely covers production
costs and they can hardly find market outlets.
In conclusion, the reputation of the Corsican clementine
PGI goes hand in hand with exemplary, eco-friendly cropping
practices. However, the diffusion of a biocontrol method is
hindered because local actors have shared objectives to con-
trol the visual quality of the fruit.
3.2.3 Long pruning
In recent years, a controversial method has been gaining in-
fluence in Corsica’s citrus growing area. This is “long prun-
ing.” It consists in pruning the tree severely to obtain just four
to six scaffold branches that bear no secondary branches, only
young fruiting branches (Fig. 1c). This is in contrast to tradi-
tional pruning, where the main branches divide once or twice
and numerous secondary branches occupy the center and pe-
riphery, giving the tree a uniform shape. Changing from tra-
ditional to long pruning involves 1 to 3 years of tree
restructuring. Unwanted scaffold branches are removed and
secondary branches are also cut off.
Long pruning was first developed in apple, pear, cherry,
and apricot orchards in the 1980s. In 2004, an expert from
an agribusiness firm showed the method to some Corsican
clementine farmers. This expert was introduced by a technical
advisor from the local input supply firm, well-known by the
farmers. The two technicians organized a training course and
set up a trial with a group of six volunteering farmers. The
orchards were monitored for three harvest seasons (2005–
2007), and it was found that the long pruning gave excellent
agronomic results. Building on this first success, the two ex-
perts carried other demos and training courses after 2008.
New farmers adopted long pruning, and the ones who had
already tried it converted their entire orchards.
The spread of long pruning in Corsica has been supported
by a coherent technical argument, verified by farmers’ obser-
vations. The first factor driving its adoption is that it cuts
production costs. It improves worker efficiency by making
the fruits more accessible: The center of the canopy is empty
and there are wide spaces between the branches, opening the
way for picking. Moreover, as the harvest approaches, the
young, non-lignified fruiting branches bend under the weight
of the growing fruits. A farmer who uses the new pruning
technique testifies: “In the past, [for harvesting] my workers
constantly had to climb into the trees. […]. Now we have
reduced harvest costs because there is no longer picking inside
the trees, no need for climbing up the ladder: the branches
bend down”. Costs are also cut by the reduced pruning time.
Once the tree has been reconfigured, pruning only consists in
removing the older side branches from the scaffold branches.
A second factor driving the adoption of long pruning is that it
gives fruits of better caliber and better visual quality.
According to farmers and technical advisors, this is because
with fewer branches, fruits in the lower and central canopy
receive more light. “I’ve been using it [long pruning] for a
decade. The trees are doing better. I’ve had improvements in
caliber, yield and earliness. Down there in the trees’ skirts, the
smallest fruits have got bigger”, said a farmer. Long pruning
also helps pesticide and liquid fertilizer applications penetrate
to the interior of the trees, improving crop treatment efficiency
and leading to better control of the pests that affect the fruits’
visual appearance.
However, those in favor of reducing or stopping using
chemical inputs are strongly opposed to long pruning. They
are the PGI defense and management organization, the exper-
imental station, and the organic farming advisory organization.
From their viewpoint, because long pruning was developed to
improve the penetration of chemical sprays into tree foliage, it
nurtures the idea of progress driven by agrochemicals. For
other actors (research organizations, nursery growers’
Class Extra 
(including Label Rouge)
Class I 
(including PGI)
Class II 
(non-PGI)
Average gross
price for caliber 2 
(euros)
Fig. 2 Average gross price of
Corsican clementines for caliber 2
(euros) per category of visual
aspect (average of the prices from
2004 up to 2014). Data source:
AOP Fruits de Corse
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association), there is a risk that the trees will decline rapidly.
Cutting back the vegetative biomass so drastically may cause
an imbalance in growth between the aerial part and the root-
stock, “strangling” the tree. Meanwhile, extension officers
from the chamber of agriculture and cooperatives warn farmers
of another threat: Long pruning may make the trees more vul-
nerable by increasing the amount of light that penetrate inside
the canopy. They think it will cause sun-burn on the main
branches and make the tree more susceptible to water stress.
They also argue that the pruning injuries caused by the initial
tree reshaping facilitate fungal attacks. The president of the
citrus fruit inter-branch organization says, “Farmers are sawing
their trees into pieces! But at the first fungal attack, the trees
die!”. More generally, all those opposed to long pruning worry
about the lack of hindsight in the transposition of an approach
that was developed elsewhere, on other tree species. For them,
the rhetoric is seemingly well-oiled but is not based on a
knowledge of citrus physiology.
As things stand, nothing can prevent the spread of long
pruning within the Corsican clementine niche. The first reason
is that the chamber of agriculture and the cooperatives have
lost influence. The extension officers of both these structures
have significantly reduced their advisory activity because they
put most of their time and resources into enforcing the PGI
specifications. They are unable to make their voices heard
against the competing voices of the input suppliers.
The PGI has played an ambiguous role in the innovation
process related to long pruning. On the one hand, it has ac-
tively encouraged its use by reinforcing the market rule on the
fruits’ visual quality (long pruning improves the efficacy of
chemical treatment). On the other hand, the PGI embodies
informal rules that penalize long pruning. In drawing up the
specification sheet, local actors have collectively defined an
ideotype for the Corsican clementine orchard as one with
small plots of old trees, wedged between sea and mountain.
This idealized picture evokes the heritage aspect of the tree.
Hence, the definition of typicality provided by the PGI com-
prises not only the product: It extends to the orchard itself. It is
through this prism that niche actors assess the impact of any
technical change. In the view of many actors, long pruning
foreshadows orchards that do not fit the niche’s conceptual
foundations: orchards are not “natural” but chemically treated,
nor are they perennial, since they are quickly exhausted. That
is enough to make a significant part of the local network of
actors reject long pruning. But, the PGI specifications do not
lay down good pruning practices, so there is no way for the
defense and management organization to reject this
innovation.
In conclusion, long pruning of clementine trees is suc-
cessful because it synergizes with farmers’ objectives
such as lower production costs, larger caliber, and better
visual quality. The current controversy over long pruning
highlights the tensions between these objectives, and
another vision of progress based on agroecology and
typicality.
3.3 Cross-analysis of the three case studies
Based on cross-case analysis, we now discuss the importance
of controversies over technical innovations for making niche-
regime tensions more visible and for improving niche
governance.
3.3.1 The sociotechnical regime affects the niche innovation
pathway
The sustainability of the Corsican clementine niche depends
on farmers achieving both fruit typicality and green cropping
systems. Yet, the local innovation process is not shaped only
by the niche’s functioning; as our study of three controversial
innovations shows, the strategies of the farmers and all the
other network actors are also constrained bymore global rules,
stemming from the sociotechnical regime. The various com-
ponents of the Corsican clementine sector—agricultural pro-
duction, varietal breeding, research and development, market,
norms, and public policies—all converge to seek large, un-
blemished fruits. This explains why some regime-driven in-
novations (SRA 535, long pruning) are adopted by farmers,
while niche-consistent innovations (biological control) are
rejected. The three interlinked components of the
sociotechnical regime—rules, actors, and material artifacts
(Geels 2004)—intrude into the niche and divert the local in-
novation process:
Rules—The Corsican niche is not free from the regime’s
rules. For instance, marketers bring mass-market pay-
ment scales into the niche (higher price for large caliber
and unblemished peel). This encourages farmers to plant
large-caliber varieties and to reject biological control.
There are also informal rules. Our case study shows that
local actors use regime-driven cognitive frames to judge
each other: The good farmer is the one who obtains large,
unblemished fruits on a regular basis.
Actors—Regime rules guide the development of shared
objectives and interdependence among local actors. As
we showed in our three examples, there can be no profit-
able sorting or marketing if the farmers have not managed
their crops properly. Strategies reinforce each other, giv-
ing farmers no latitude: High-potential varieties, chemical
pest control, and long pruning are the best ways to im-
prove fruit caliber and visual quality. Of course, strategies
are heterogeneous, and not all actors collude with the
regime’s rules. But, no one can move too far from it,
owing to mutual dependencies. For instance, the PGI de-
fense and management organization is opposed to the
spread of SRA 535. But, it is not feasible to change the
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PGI rules to prevent the use of this variety: Doing so
would exclude the farmers and marketing organizations
who have vested interests in SRA 535. The whole PGI
scheme would be weakened by losing participants.
Artifacts—Regime rules can also be embedded in techni-
cal artifacts that are not easily abandoned. In the Corsican
clementine niche, many material investments have been
made to comply with the regime’s rules. For instance,
packers have built sorting stations in order to sell batches
with uniform caliber and spotless fruits. But, these mate-
rial investments carry embedded rules that hinder niche
emancipation: Efficiency in the packing stations is pro-
portional to the diameter of the incoming fruits. The hard-
ness of material artifacts is also a powerful source of path
dependency. Local breeders spent two decades develop-
ing SRA 535. The aim was to align with the Spanish
model at a time when the niche was weak. Today, this
variety is recognized as a threat to the niche strategy. But,
breeders cannot easily go back on their decision: The
breeding process for trees is very slow, and SRA 535 is
now used as a model in agronomic trials. For their part,
the farmers who regret having planted SRA 535 are faced
with prohibitive grubbing-up costs.
3.3.2 Niche functioning mitigates expression of the regime’s
rules
Regime rules penetrate the niche, but local actors are not pas-
sively compliant. The innovation process is also framed by a set
of place-specific rules enacted by niche-actors. As Belmin et al.
(2018) demonstrated, the Corsican clementine niche embeds a
coherent set of rules that accumulated over time under the in-
fluence of the island’s natural features and resources, and were
formalized in constructing the PGI. As the cross-case analysis
suggests, this locally embedded rule system acts as a “filter” to
innovations stemming from the regime. In other words, the
functioning of the niche mitigates expression of the regime’s
rules at the local level. Building on Scott (1995), we identify
three types of rules that provide a counterweight to the regime:
Regulatory rules: Some of the formal rules in the PGI
specifications directly hinder the adoption of innovations
that threaten typicality. For instance, the exclusion of cal-
iber 0 from the PGI acts as a powerful “call-back mech-
anism,” reducing the incentive to use SRA 535.
Normative rules: The niche also conveys shared values
and responsibilities that help to shape the niche-actors’
strategies. In particular, because of the added value that a
protected origin brings, local actors manage the
clementine’s typicality and reputation as common goods.
This explains why some actors reject the regime-driven
innovations, while others reshape them to synergize with
the clementine PGI (selecting rootstocks so as to reduce
fruit size in SRA 535). Similarly, the commitment of
Research and Development actors to biological control
is fostered by the eco-friendly reputation of the
Corsican clementine.
Cognitive rules: The niche filters innovations coming
from the regime by means of stabilized concepts, narra-
tives, and idealized images that shape local actors’ per-
ceptions. These cognitive frames developed over a long
period and were later clarified when the PGI was drawn
up. Thus, the value of SRA 535 and long pruning respec-
tively is assessed in the light of ideotypes of product and
orchard. Even if they fit the PGI specifications, the nov-
elties that are too far from the “local norm” generate cog-
nitive dissonance and may be objected.
3.3.3 The active role of controversies in niche governance
There are limits to the niche’s regulatory capability. The regime
creeps in through every breach in the niche’s defense mecha-
nisms. This is obvious with the atypical variety SRA 535,
which was able to gain a foothold in the appellation because
of the loose definition of varietal type in the PGI. Similarly,
long pruning is allowed by the imprecise specifications on
pruning in the PGI. Finally, it has been spreading because the
advisors from the chamber of agriculture and cooperatives were
not on the spot. They were distracted from their advisory role
by their key role in enforcing the PGI. In our second case study,
biological pest control is making no clear progress because
Class II fruits are excluded from the PGI.
In the Corsican case, the controversies arising from the
various innovations play an active role in niche governance:
They have helped local actors to identify the tensions between
niche and regime and to take regulatory action. After the PGI
came into operation, the threat of crisis receded and, as a
result, collective action weakened; from 2007, the defense
and management organization settled into a routine, running
on autopilot. Then, in 2016–2017, because of the issues raised
by the three controversies, local actors conducted a participa-
tory forward study. They built five scenarios describing pos-
sible futures for citrus production in Corsica in 2040. The
threats and opportunities entailed in the scenarios led to dis-
cussions about possible revision of the PGI specifications. In
particular, participants mentioned possible ways to hinder the
spread of SRA 535 (exclusion of caliber 1 from the PGI,
elaboration of sensory benchmarks to describe the typicality
of Corsican clementine) and ways to improve the product’s
environmental credentials (general shift to organic farming,
inclusion of the Class II fruits in the PGI). They eventually
decided on a change in supply chain governance: They have
broadened the remit of the citrus fruit inter-branch organiza-
tion, devising a new commission tasked with providing a
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strategic long-term vision. In short, the outbreak of controver-
sies acted as a trigger, stimulating the niche-actors to formu-
late the problems caused by niche-regime interactions and
make a change in niche governance.
Science and Technology Studies scholars have shown that
technological controversies (also called “sociotechnical contro-
versies”) can play an active role in the governance of innovation
(Callon 1981; Torre 2016). Controversy is an informal process
through which new technologies can be assessed (Joly 2001;
Rip 1986). By expanding the framework of risk assessment for
any novelty, controversy forces innovation promoters to open
the black box of their implicit assumptions and clarify their
projects’ underlying values. This widens the range of possibili-
ties and choices. In some cases, all this can lead to a new con-
sensus and renewed governance of the local innovation pathway
(Rip 1986). Although our study is not part of Science and
Technology Studies, its findings are consistent with that body
of literature. We argue that, in the Corsican clementine niche,
controversies are the process through which (i) regime-driven
innovations are assessed (and sometimes reshaped) in the light
of the niche’s rule system. This has been the case with SRA 535
and long pruning; (ii) niche-actors raise the alarm when innova-
tions that are consistent with their niche are hampered by the
regime. This was mainly the case for biological pest control. All
this suggests that the sustainability of niches lies in the niche-
actors’ ability to take advantage of sociotechnical controversies.
In this respect, Research and Development organizations have a
key role to play. By studying the controversies over technical
innovations, they can shed light on the regime’s influence over
the within-niche innovation pathway and so contribute to proac-
tive governance of niches. For a simple, pragmatic method, one
could take the approach used in this article. It consists in a four-
step analysis: Step 1—identify the technical innovations causing
tensions among niche-actors (preliminary survey of the main
niche representatives) and becoming controversial; Step 2—for
each controversial innovation, search for the drivers that stimu-
late or hinder adoption by farmers (systematic survey of
farmers); Step 3—study the competing discourses, strategies,
and networks surrounding each controversial innovation (sur-
veys of the actors involved in the sociotechnical niche); and
Step 4—identify the various shared rule systems that coexist
locally, and the loci of friction between two contrasting
sociotechnical systems.
3.4 A niche nested within the regime
Sociotechnical niches are usually regarded as isolated net-
works that emerge outside regimes. Indeed, most scholars
speak about “niche-actors” and “regime-actors” (see an
example in Darrot et al. 2014); when analyzing niche-regime
interactions, they implicitly assume the existence of two dis-
tinct networks working in different directions, two groups of
actors that either ignore or use each other (Ingram 2015). For
instance, niche-actors can use the regime’s internal tensions
and enlist hybrid actors (Diaz et al. 2013; Geels and Raven
2006). But, in our case, niche-regime interactions take a dif-
ferent shape. Our findings show that there is no separation
between the networks of actors that reproduce the rules of
the niche or that of the regime. In fact, each actor has an
ambivalent strategy. Farmers have to make trade-offs between
contradictory objectives since there is a mismatch between
what the regime expects and what collective reputation re-
quires. So, Corsican clementine cannot be regarded as an iso-
lated niche. On the contrary, it is nested within the citrus
sociotechnical regime. On the one hand, the niche conveys
locally embedded rules encouraging local actors to maintain
the product’s typicality. On the other, some of the regimes’
rules apply within the niche, encouraging the use of varieties
or techniques that are not consistent with the functioning of
the niche. So, the distinction between niche-actors and
regime-actors is not relevant here. Rather, we have to distin-
guish between antagonistic rule systems that are enacted and
reproduced through the everyday practices of local actors.
The idea of a “nested niche” is not completely new. It has
been implicitly put forward in mainstream transition theory,
although largely ignored by those who use that theory.
According to Geels (2011), sociotechnical niches, regimes,
and landscape are not necessarily distinct networks: They rep-
resent various levels of the structuring of human activities, in-
volving increasing number of actors. In other words, the three
levels coevolve and participate together in shaping actors’ prac-
tices. Moreover, niches are described as spaces where regime
rules are not entirely absent but are only weakly articulated
(Geels 2004). This is precisely what is going on in our case
study: The regime’s rules intrude into the niche in a debased
form because the niche’s functioningmitigates their expression.
This new perspective on niche-regime interactions opens a
promising field of investigation. Alternative food systems are
popping up all across the world, on the fringes of the dominant
agro-industrial food system (Esnouf et al. 2013). Whether driv-
en by environmental, ethical, health, or heritage concerns, these
alternative food systems are spaces where small networks of
actors invent newways of producing, consuming, and exchang-
ing. However, alternative and conventional food networks are
not separate spheres (Sonnino and Marsden 2005). By analyz-
ing alternative food systems as sociotechnical niches nested
withinmainstream regimes, we could gain an interesting insight
into their complex relationships.
4 Conclusion
Agricultural niches often take the form of alternative agri-food
systems with endogenous innovation pathway. Such niches
are major sources of diversity for agriculture and food world-
wide. However, niches can collapse if they are intruded upon
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by regime-driven technical innovations. To prevent the niche
from reverting to the regime’s rules, local actors have to im-
prove their management of niche-regime interactions.
In this paper, we have wondered to what extent the techni-
cal innovations that are subject to controversies can shed light
on the weak spots of niche governance. To answer that ques-
tion, we analyzed the conditions under which three controver-
sial innovations spread in the Corsican clementine niche: a
clementine variety, a biological pest control method, and a
pruning technique. Our cross-case analysis suggests that con-
troversies make niche-regime tensions more visible, leading
local actors to make collective decisions for governing the
innovation pathway. This is the first study to highlight the
key role of sociotechnical controversies for understanding
and managing niche-regime tensions.
These results suggest that Corsican clementine cannot be
considered as an isolated niche. On the contrary, this niche is a
subsystem partly nested within, and partly free of, the citrus
sociotechnical regime. This point puts a new perspective on
coexistence in agriculture. Past studies had described systems
that coexist side by side, like genetically modified/non-
genetically modified crops (Hannachi 2011) or organic/
conventional agriculture (Belz 2004). Here, we point out that
sometimes, one system can be nested within another. The rule
systems for niche and regime coexist at the local level since
they compete within the same network of actors. This new
perspective could question the basic nature of transition for
agricultural sociotechnical regimes. Until now, a transition
towards more sustainable agriculture has been understood as
a monolithic regime shift, through transformation, reconfigu-
ration, technological substitution, and/or de-alignment/re-
alignment (Geels and Schot 2007). Yet, in agriculture, things
seem to take a different shape. There is now a global move-
ment towards market segmentation, driven by the emerging
consumer demand for products with environmental, ethical,
health, or heritage qualities. Could this trend stimulate a new
type of transition, in which a regime slowly fragments into
several insular “productive worlds” that interact while each
follows its own innovation pathway? If so, such transitions
would be interesting to study.
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